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”One Exam Determines One’s Life”: The




This Note first outlines the history of the hukou system in China before and after the major
economic reform of 1978. Second, this Note outlines the specific institutional barriers that mi-
grant children face when accessing compulsory, secondary, and tertiary education, with a specific
focus on the hukou system. Third, this Note analyzes the goals and content of China’s State Coun-
cil’s opinion released on September 4, 2014 suggesting a reform to the gaokao system intended
to alleviate the institutional barriers to education. Finally, this Note argues that first, the State
Council’s suggested reform directly addresses only one of the multiple institutional barriers that
migrant children face in accessing tertiary education, and even then, does not provide adequate
specificities to make any real impact and, second, ultimately without major reform to the hukou
system the government will be unable to achieve a level of equality between urban and migrant
students.
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INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS THAT MIGRANT 




“The school years are too long, courses too many, 
and the method of teaching is by injection instead of 
through the imagination. The method of examination 
is to treat candidates as enemies and ambush them. 
Therefore, I advise you not to entertain any blind faith 
in the Chinese educational system. Do not regard it as 
a good system. Any drastic change is difficult, as 
many people would oppose it.”1 
- Chairman Mao Zedong, 1964 
INTRODUCTION 
The Chinese government is beginning to identify the numerous 
institutional barriers that migrant students face in accessing tertiary 
education and attempting to address the impediments to create an 
environment where all citizens, not just the elite, have access to 
higher education.2 Each June, Chinese high school seniors sit for 
probably the most important exam they will ever take, the national 
                                                            
1. Chairman Mao Zedong offered this advice to a group of Nepalese teachers who visited 
Beijing in 1964 to learn from the Chinese education model. Mao Tse-tung, On Education - 
Conversation with the Nepalese Delegation of Educationists (1964), Full Text of “Selected 
Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. IX,” INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/stream/Selected
WorksOfMaoTse-tungVol.Ix/MicrosoftWord-Document1_djvu.txt (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); 
Sheila Melvin, China’s College Revolution, 30 WILSON QUARTERLY 37, 37 (2006). 
2. China’s State Council designed the Chinese college admissions reform to increase 
equality by allocating more spaces to underrepresented students from rural areas and inland 
provinces. The Implementation Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Examination and 
Enrollment System "关于深化考试招生制度改革的实施意见,” STATE COUNCIL PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-09/04/content_27456
53.htm (translated by Xin Xin Chen and Jing Liu, LLM Students at Fordham University 
School of Law) [hereinafter Examination Reform 2014]; see Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga & 
David Cohen, Anti-Privilege Campaign Hits the Chinese Middle Class, CHINA BRIEF, Sept. 
10, 2014, at 1, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=
42812&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=381&cHash=21cef677728b0b69b465cffb0264206e#.VC
W5VitdWPI (stating this reform is likely to be the most “public-facing component of a wide-
ranging effort by the Xi Jinping administration to address perceptions of elite privilege and 
social inequality”). 
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college entrance exam called the gaokao (“高考gāokǎo”).3 Many 
students agree, “one exam determines one’s life.”4 
Students in the United States can relate to the pressures 
surrounding college entrance exams, such as the Scholastic Aptitude 
Test (“SAT”) or the American College Testing (“ACT”); however, 
the pressure that students in the United States face does not compare 
to that of Chinese students for a number of reasons.5 First, the gaokao 
is more than twice the length (approximately nine hours as compared 
to four) and is only offered once a year, eliminating the possibility of 
retaking the exam for a higher score until the following year.6 Second, 
while Chinese universities admit students based solely on their 
gaokao scores, universities in the United States consider SAT scores 
merely as one factor among many used to determine acceptances 
including high school grades, personal statements, and extracurricular 
activities.7 As a result, the gaokao has much higher stakes for Chinese 
                                                            
3. The gaokao is important to Chinese students because it is the only factor considered 
for college admissions, getting into college is incredibly difficult because of the number of 
applicants, and attending an elite university creates better employment opportunities. See Xin-
Ran Duan, Chinese Higher Education Enters a New Era, ACADEME, Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 22, 
24 (stating that the gaokao is “probably the most important examination [Chinese students] 
will ever sit”); Gregory Kristof, China GaoKao Reflects Importance and Extremes of Nation’s 
College Entrance Exam, HUFFPOST EDUC. (June 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/06/07/china-gaokao_n_1578905.html.   
4.  “One exam determines one’s life” is a popular way to describe the gaokao because, 
for Chinese students, the gaokao is widely regarded as the principal determinant of their future 
success. See Wang Jian, An Exploration of the Reform of National College Entrance 
Examination and Enrollment System, in 1 CHINESE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON 
EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 155, 168-69 (Yang Dongping ed., 2013) (stating that the 
feeling that “one score determines your whole life” still exists); Lifeng Li, A Narrative Study 
of Thirty Years of Entrance Exam Reform in Shanghai, CHINESE EDUC. & SOC’Y, Jan.-Feb. 
2013, at 23, 27; Liu Jiaying & Shi Rui, The Multiple Changes and Hopes Brought by the 
Gaokao Reform, CHINA DEV. BRIEF (Sept. 5, 2014), http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/news/
multiple-changes-hopes-brought-gaokao-reform/; see also Sharon Lafraniere, Failure Is Not 
an Option: China’s Annual College Entrance Exam Can Make or Break Young Lives, N.Y. 
TIMES UPFRONT, Jan. 28, 2013, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Failure+is+not+an
+option%3A+China's+annual+college+entrance+exam+can...-a0316663422; China to Reform 
College Entrance Exam, Enrollment System, XINHUA (Sept. 4, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/indepth/2014-09/04/c_133621671.htm [hereinafter Xinhua Sept. 2014]. 
5. See infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.    
6. See FEI-LING WANG, ORGANIZING THROUGH DIVISION AND EXCLUSION: CHINA’S 
HUKOU SYSTEM, 140 (2005); Lafraniere, supra note 4.  
7. While the SAT is only one portion of the American admissions decision, the gaokao is 
by far the most significant factor, if not the only factor, in Chinese college admissions. See 
Kristof, supra note 3; see also Jian Wang, supra note 4, at 169; Zhuran You & Yingzi Hu, 
Walking a Policy Tightrope: The Dilemma of Balancing Diversification and Equality in 
Chinese College Entrance Examination Reform, 26 Higher Educ. Policy 309, 309 (2013); 
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students than the SAT has for students applying to universities in the 
United States.8 
Chinese students from rural China are at a great disadvantage 
compared to their urban counterparts when taking the gaokao, and 
have lower chances of gaining admission to top tier universities.9 The 
main reason for this inequality is the household registration system, 
the hukou (“户口hùkǒu”).10 The hukou is a residency status system 
that links government-provided services, including education, to the 
individual’s registered address.11 Therefore, when a rural resident 
moves to an urban area outside of his or her registered hukou 
location, the government is no longer required to provide social 
services to that individual.12 Despite the restrictions that limit 
                                                                                                                                     
Xinhua Sept. 2014, supra note 4; Yan Yiqi, Shanghai, Zhejiang to Pilot Gaokao Reforms, 
PEOPLE.CN (Sept. 20, 2014) http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0920/c90882-8785
479.html.   
8. The gaokao is a high-stakes, high-pressure exam that is unrivaled even by the SAT. 15 
Facts About China’s Grueling College Entrance Exam, COLLEGESTATS, http://collegestats.org
/2012/08/15-facts-about-chinas-grueling-college-entrance-exam/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); 
see Lafraniere, supra note 4 (“For Chinese students, the stress [of the gaokao] can be 
overwhelming.”); Beauchamp-Mustafaga, supra note 2. 
9. See Xiaobing Wang et al., What is Keeping the Poor Out of College? Enrollment 
Rates, Educational Barriers and College Matriculation in China 36 (Rural Educ. Action 
Project Working Paper 210, 2009), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22723/210_
Wang_et_al_What_is_Keeping_the_Poor_out_of_College_China_Journal.pdf (“the 
participation rate of the poor in accessing the opportunity for a college education is 
substantially lower than the students from nonpoor families . . . . [O]nly four percent of 
students from poor rural areas are able to enter tier one, two or three universities.”); The Road 
to University, PROJECT CHINA 2008, 17 (Aug. 2008), http://www.projectchina.se/
Boken/eboken.pdf (“you need significantly higher Gaokao scores if you come from rural areas 
or underdeveloped regions”). 
10. See PROJECT CHINA 2008, supra note 9, at 17 (explaining that universities may place 
geographical restrictions based on the hukou system in order to reserve up to 30% of their 
places to candidates from the region in which the university is located); see also Farzana 
Afridi et al., Social Identity and Inequality: The Impact of China’s Hukou System 23 (Inst. for 
the Study of Labor, IZA Discussion Paper No. 6417, 2012) (concluding that there is a causal 
effect of administratively-created social identity in distorting individuals’ performance on 
incentivized tasks and potentially exacerbating existing inequalities in the distribution of gains 
from economic growth).  
11. Wei Jianwen & Hou Jiawei, The Household Registration System, Education System, 
and Inequalities in Education for Migrant Children, CHINESE EDUC. & SOC’Y, Sept.-Oct. 
2010, at 77, 79 (stating that the hukou system is one of the main institutional sources of 
educational inequality for migrant children); see Afridi et al., supra note 10, at 3 (noting the 
relationship between the hukou system and children’s education).  
12. See JASON YOUNG, CHINA’S HUKOU SYSTEM: MARKETS, MIGRANTS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 1 (2013); Afridi et al., supra note 10, at 8 (noting that when internal 
migrants move from their place of permanent hukou residence to another hukou zone they are 
not eligible for social services unless they can transfer their hukou to the new area). 
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government-provided services to one’s hometown, as of 2013 there 
were about 269 million rural Chinese citizens, typically from inland 
villages, living in the developed coastal metropolises (such as Beijing 
and Shanghai) in order to earn a better living and to support their 
families.13  
Rural children dream of “getting out of the rural gate,” meaning 
to trade in their rural residence for an urban hukou.14 The college 
degree, afforded through success on the gaokao, can give rural 
transplants an opportunity to acquire a permanent local urban hukou, 
allowing them to remain in areas of greater economic opportunity 
legally and indefinitely.15 Without eliminating the hukou’s role in 
education laws, migrant children will not be able to compete and gain 
access to tertiary education equally with their urban counterparts. 
Reforming the gaokao, while a step in the right direction, is not in 
itself a solution to existing educational disparities. At the same time, 
this Note recognizes that the logical alternative—completely 
unlinking the hukou system and the education systems—is not an 
easy feat either, and potentially could create new problems. 
This Note first outlines the history of the hukou system in China 
before and after the major economic reform of 1978. Second, this 
Note outlines the specific institutional barriers that migrant children 
face when accessing compulsory, secondary, and tertiary education, 
with a specific focus on the hukou system. Third, this Note analyzes 
                                                            
13. See Migrant Workers and Their Children, CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, http://www.
clb.org.hk/en/view-resource-centre-content/110306 (last visited July 28, 2015) (noting that 
despite the hukou system, there are approximately 262 million rural migrant workers in China) 
[hereinafter China Labour Bulletin]; Statistical Communiqué of the People's Republic of China 
on the 2013 National Economic and Social Development, NAT’L STAT. BUREAU CHINA (Feb. 
24, 2014), http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201402/t20140224_515103.html 
(stating that in 2013 there were 268.94 million migrant workers); YOUNG, supra note 12, at 51 
(“[M]ost of China’s wealth accumulat[es] in the more developed eastern provinces, 
perpetuating the trend towards migrating to the east where . . . incomes are higher . . . . 
Migrants from poor rural areas can earn far more than they could at home.”). 
14. See Gaoming Zhang et al., Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Higher Education 
Reform and Innovation in China, 20 ON THE HORIZON 263, 268 (2012) (explaining that 
enrolling in a university or getting a job in a prosperous area means the sponsorship for a new 
hukou in the prosperous area and therefore the eligibility for better overall benefits); see also 
YOUNG, supra note 12, at 49 (explaining that even though rural people move to the cities, 
work and live there for long periods of time, they cannot officially migrate because they 
cannot transfer their hukou location to their new place of residence).  
15. See Gaoming Zhang, supra note 14, at 268 (stating that earning a college degree can 
give rural students an opportunity to earn a job in the governmental sector, which guarantees 
an urban hukou); FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at xii (explaining that one of the only ways to 
legally acquire permanent local residency in an urban center is by getting a college degree).  
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the goals and content of China’s State Council’s opinion released on 
September 4, 2014 suggesting a reform to the gaokao system intended 
to alleviate the institutional barriers to education. Finally, this Note 
argues that first, the State Council’s suggested reform directly 
addresses only one of the multiple institutional barriers that migrant 
children face in accessing tertiary education, and even then, does not 
provide adequate specificities to make any real impact and, second, 
ultimately without major reform to the hukou system the government 
will be unable to achieve a level of equality between urban and 
migrant students.  
I. THE HUKOU SYSTEM: CHINA’S HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION 
SYSTEM 
This Part outlines the major legal system that has historically 
created barriers to education for migrant children: the hukou system.16 
The hukou system can be divided into three major time periods: 
before the 1978 economic reforms, after the 1978 reforms, and the 
most recent 2014 reforms.17 It is important to understand the hukou 
system before learning about China’s education system because the 
two are inextricably linked.18 
Before 1978 China operated under a planned economy; the 
hukou system allowed the government to regulate the population to 
assure that rural citizens would continue to work the farms so as not 
to move elsewhere and neglect the country’s agriculture.19 Beginning 
                                                            
16. See Jianwen, supra note 11, at 78, 79 (arguing that the sources of educational 
inequality for migrant children rest in the hukou and educational systems); Wu Yuxiao, 
Educational Opportunities for Rural and Urban Residents in China, 1978-2008: Inequality 
and Evolution, SOC. SCI. CHINA, Aug. 2, 2013, at 58, 58 (discussing rural-urban divide in 
educational opportunities). 
17. See infra Parts I.A-C.  
18. See Jianwen, supra note 11, at 79-80 (explaining that under the hukou system, the 
education system was implemented as “local responsibility and level-by-level administration;” 
funding was allocated according to the number of students with residence registrations); Josh 
Rudolph, Education Gap Remains After Hukou, Gaokao Reforms, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES 
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/education-gap-remains-hukou-gaokao-
reforms/ (explaining that the hukou and education systems are inextricably linked because 
students can only access government-provided social services, including education, in their 
registered place of residence). 
19. See CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (explaining that the hukou system was 
supposed to ensure that China’s rural population stayed in the countryside and continued to 
provide food that urban residents needed); Charlotte Goodburn, The End of the Hukou System? 
Not Yet 2 (Univ. of Nottingham China Policy Inst. Policy Paper No. 2, 2014) (noting the goal 
of promoting agriculture). 
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in 1978, China shifted to a capitalist market economy, which 
generated a need to relax the hukou system in order to promote the 
migration of cheap labor from rural towns into the cities.20 The 
Chinese citizens with rural hukous who moved from their rural homes 
to the cities in search of employment are called “rural migrant 
workers.”21 While the hukou system still remains in effect today, in 
July 2014, China’s State Council announced a reform to the system to 
promote greater equality between urban residents and migrant 
workers and their children.22  
A. Pre-1978 Economic Reform: The Planned Economy with an 
Eye Towards Promoting Agriculture and Strict Internal 
Migration Controls  
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
promulgated a set of administrative regulations forming the legal 
basis of the hukou system in 1958.23 The government classified every 
Chinese resident as rural (“agricultural”) or urban (“non-agricultural”) 
and assigned each person a permanent residence on this basis.24 Only 
                                                            
20. See Justin Yifu Lin, Lessons of China’s Transition from a Planned Economy to a 
Market Economy, 1 (Dec. 17, 2004) (noting the beginning of China’s market-oriented reforms 
in 1978); Hayden Windrow & Anik Guha, The Hukou System, Migrant Workers, & State 
Power in the People's Republic of China, 3 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (2005) (stating that 
the economic reform since 1978 reoriented the country’s “once-Soviet style planned economy 
toward the market”). 
21. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 3 (defining rural migrant workers (农民工) as rural 
laborers moving into urban employment and living on the margins of urban society with 
temporary residency visas); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (defining rural migrant 
workers (农民工) as those with a rural hukou who are employed in an urban workplace). 
22. See CIRCULAR OF THE STATE COUNCIL: OPINION ON HUKOU REFORM, (July 30, 
2014), http://chinalawtranslate.com/en/state-council-opinion-of-hukou-reform/ [hereinafter 
2014 Hukou Reform]; Goodburn, supra note 19, at 1 (explaining the circular on the end of the 
hukou system).  
23. According to the Constitution, the National People’s Congress is the highest law-
making body at the national level and has the power to make national laws, while the State 
Council and its ministries have legislative power to make the administrative regulations 
necessary to enforce, interpret, and supervise the law. Wing-Wah Law & Su-Yan Pan, 
Legislation and Equality in Basic Education for All in China, 40 INTERCHANGE 337, 342 
(2009); see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli [Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China on Hukou Registration] (issued Jan. 9, 1958) art. 5. (stating that the hukou 
system was promulgated in 1958). 
24. See Mingqiong Zhang et al., The Institution of Hukou-based Social Exclusion, 38.4 
Int’l J. Urb. & Reg’l Research 1437, 1442 (2014) (stating the distinction between rural and 
urban classifications); Goodburn, supra note 19, at 2 (defining the two classifications); CHINA 
LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (explaining that individuals are broadly categorized as 
“rural” or “urban” based on their place of residence); Christina Larson, The Change in China’s 
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registered residents in a specific location can access social services 
including housing, health care, and education in that jurisdiction.25 
For example, if a resident from a rural area migrates to Beijing, he or 
she has no right to any fundamental government services.26  
Like a caste system, the hukou divides China’s population into 
two classes with the urban resident economically and socially 
superior to the rural resident.27 For example, this rural-urban 
classification creates vast inequalities in educational opportunities; 
the central government puts more resources and attention into urban 
education than into rural education.28 This system also influences 
Chinese governance styles because local governments are only 
                                                                                                                                     
Hukou Policy Hasn’t Solved the Education Gap for Beijing’s Migrant Children, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-09-10/china-s-
hukou-policy-change-hasn-t-solved-education-gap-for-beijing-s-migrant-children (stating the 
distinction between rural and urban classifications).  
25. See Shuang Chen et al., Parental Migration and Children’s Academic Engagement: 
The Case of China, 59 INT’L REV. EDUC. 693, 696 (2013) (stating that access to social services 
is limited by one’s hukou); Law & Pan, supra note 23, at 348 (explaining that the hukou 
system links public services to domicile registration); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 
13 (describing the hukou system as one that entitles only registered residents access to social 
welfare services).  
26. See Jianwen, supra note 11, at 79 (explaining that the hukou system is the main basis 
for government allocations of various resources and serves as the principal qualification for 
obtaining such social welfare benefits and rights as education and employment); Mingqiong 
Zhang, supra note 24, at 1443 (“Urban-hukou holders have a range of benefits and 
entitlements that rural-hukou holders do not enjoy.”). 
27. See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 24, 127 (stating that the urban population, 
which is only 14-26% of the total population, has had better access to economic and social 
opportunities, activities, and benefits, and has also dominated Chinese politics because of its 
urban hukou status; the hukou system is responsible for unequal income distribution across 
regions and an uneven economy in general between rural and urban areas; major income and 
spending gaps between rural and urban residents as well as per capita income; urban residents 
enjoy a much higher income level than rural residents in every administrative unit across the 
country); Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in 
China: Processes and Changes 24 (Ctr. for Studies in Demography & Ecology Univ. of 
Wash., Working Paper No. 99-16, 1999) (noting huge differences in economic opportunity and 
social position between those with urban hukou and those without).  
28. See Jianwen, supra note 11, at 79, 81 (noting that the hukou system causes 
inequalities for rural children – shortages of educational funds for migrant students; evaluation 
systems only take into account local students so schools pay more attention to education of 
students with local residence permits); Teng Margaret Fu, Unequal Primary Education 
Opportunities in Rural and Urban China, CHINA PERSPECTIVES, July-Aug. 2005, at ¶ 2 
(explaining that primary education in rural China is marginalized as compared to that of urban 
China because 1. of emphasis on immediate economic growth rather than long-term 
improvement in educational development, 2. urban education receives more attention and 
resources from the central government; because of the lack of public educational funding in 
rural areas, children from peasant families are often forced to drop out of schools at the junior 
high, or even primary level). 
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responsible to local hukou holders rather than being required to take 
into account all local inhabitants including those without local 
hukous.29 For example, the local governments are only responsible for 
allocating school funding based on the number of students with local 
hukous, excluding migrant students who live in the city.30  
The hukou system was originally conceptualized to allow the 
government to distribute resources, and control internal migration.31 
Historically, one of the main reasons for controlling internal 
migration was to promote the country’s agricultural sector and protect 
it from neglect.32 The government wanted to prevent farmers from 
rushing to the cities in search of higher wages than were available in 
the agricultural system.33 Under the constraints of the hukou system it 
was very difficult for rural citizens to transfer their hukou 
classifications from rural to non-rural or from a smaller city to a more 
populous city.34 To cap urban migration, the government enforced a 
                                                            
29. Mingqiong Zhang et al., supra note 24, at 1443 (stating that local governments only 
take care of local-hukou holders); see Hudson Lockett, Hukou Reform: Beijing Abolishes 
“Agricultural” Residence Class, but Rural-Urban Split Remains, CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW 
(Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/hukou-reform-beijing-abolishes-agricul
tural-residence-class-rural-urban-split-remains (explaining that local governments manage 
their own hukou-related affairs). 
30. Aris Chan, Paying the Price for Economic Development: Children of Migrant 
Workers in China 34 (China Labour Bulletin, 2009) (“Because government funding for 
education is based on the number of school age children of local residents, urban governments 
have no absolute obligation to educate migrants.”); see Jianwen, supra note 11, at 81-82 
(explaining that there is a shortage of educational funds in China because funding education 
for migrant students would greatly increase the financial burden on governments in places of 
migration).  
31. See CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13; Eileen Yuk-ha Tsang, The Quest for 
Higher Education by the Chinese Middle Class: Retrenching Social Mobility?, 66 HIGHER 
EDUC. 653, 659 (2013); Shaohua Zhan, What Determines Migrant Workers’ Life Chances in 
Contemporary China? Hukou, Social Exclusion, and the Market, 37 MODERN CHINA 243, 252 
(2011) (stating that the hukou system was designed partially to control internal migration); 
Larson, supra note 24;  Law & Pan, supra note 23, at 348; FEI-LING WANG , supra note 6, at 
24 (explaining the two main reasons for the hukou system were to control migration internally 
and to distribute resources). 
32. See CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (explaining that the hukou system was 
supposed to ensure that China’s rural population stayed in the countryside and continued to 
provide food to urban residents); Goodburn, supra note 19, at 2 (noting the goal of promoting 
agriculture).   
33. See Shuang Chen et al., supra note 25, at 696 (explaining that the hukou system 
allowed the government to control internal migration); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 
13 (stating that the hukou system allowed the government to control the production of 
agriculture). 
34. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 48 (“Government restrictions on changing ‘hukou 
zone’ through ‘hukou transfer’ are determined by a set of transfer criteria and ‘control quotas’ 
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strict quota system for converting a hukou from a rural to an urban 
area.35 
Another important aspect of the hukou system is that, unlike 
internal migration in other developing countries, migrant parents pass 
on their “outsider” status to their children.36 In other words, Children 
inherit their parents’ hukou status irrespective of where they are born 
or raised.37 This is problematic because the hukou’s hereditary nature 
prevents new generations born in urban areas with rural parents from 
ever fully integrating into urban society and competing with 
registered locals on equal footing.38 Rural citizens are unable to 
compete with local urban citizens because of employment segregation 
and a lack of social welfare benefits that result in social segregation of 
migrants: rural migrant workers are prohibited from working in 
                                                                                                                                     
on the number of inward hukou transfers to urban areas. . . . Both policy and quota are used to 
manage and limit transfers;” explaining the more developed a hukou zone, the harder it is to 
transfer a hukou and the stricter the enforcement of quotas; the smaller the city and the more 
underdeveloped it is, the lower the criteria for inward hukou transfer and more flexible the 
quota system); Mingqiong Zhang et al., supra note 24, at 1442 (stating that the hukou system 
allows the government to control hukou transfers); Goodburn, supra note 19, at 3 (explaining 
the difficulty in transferring one’s hukou). 
35. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 48 (discussing the difficult process of converting a 
rural hukou to an urban hukou); Mingqiong Zhang et al., supra note 24, at 1442 (describing 
the hukou system’s quota policy). 
36. YOUNG, supra note 12, at 60 (discussing the hereditary nature of the hukou system); 
CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (noting that the hukou system is hereditary); 
Goodburn, supra note 19, at 2 (noting the hereditary nature of the hukou system); Lihua Wang 
& Tracey Holland, In Search of Educational Equity for the Migrant Children of Shanghai, 47 
COMPARATIVE EDUCATION 471, 473 (2011) (stating that the hukou system is hereditary); 
Hilary K. Josephs, Residence and Nationality as Determinants of Status in Modern China, 46 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 295, 297 (2011) (stating every citizen inherits a household registration); 
Mingqiong Zhang et al., supra note 24, at 1442 (describing the hereditary nature of the hukou 
system). 
37. CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (explaining that children whose parents 
have a rural hukou inherit that rural hukou irrespective of their place of birth); Goodburn, 
supra note 19, at 2 (explaining the hereditary nature of the hukou system); Wang & Holland, 
supra note 36, at 473 (noting the hukou system is hereditary); Josephs, supra note 36, at 297 
(noting that citizens inherit their household registration); Mingqiong Zhang et al., supra note 
24, at 1442 (discussing the hereditary nature of the hukou system); Lin Jin, Rights-Based 
Approach to the Educational Experience of Migrant Children in China 19 (Dec. 2012) 
(unpublished research paper, International Institute of Social Studies) (stating that migrant 
children inherit their parents’ rural household registrations, even if the migrant children were 
born in the city and lived there ever since).   
38. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 60 (arguing that migrant children inherit their 
“outsider” status, preventing new generations from ever integrating into society and competing 
with locals “on an equal footing”); Afridi et al., supra note 10, at 6-7 (stating that educational 
attainment “of the next generation of rural populace was restricted by birth” because of the 
hereditary hukou system). 
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government offices and state-owned enterprises in cities, and the 
government does not provide unemployment and health benefits to 
migrant workers.39 
B. Post-1978 Economic Reform: The Transition Into a Capitalist 
Market Economy Encouraged Relaxed Internal Migration 
Policies  
Beginning in 1978, China began to undergo major economic 
reform, shifting from a planned economy to a capitalist market 
economy.40 With this major reform came additional freedoms for 
rural Chinese citizens, including greater opportunity to seek higher 
wages in the cities.41 As a result of the economic reform, there was a 
strong push for relaxation of the hukou system because its restrictions 
on mobility and exclusion of the rural population created unfavorable 
economic conditions, such as low labor efficiency and market 
segmentation.42 The reform also created higher demand for cheap 
labor in the cities.43 As a result, during the mid-1990s China 
                                                            
39. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 60 (arguing that migrant children inherit their 
“outsider” status preventing new generations from ever integrating into society and competing 
with locals “on an equal footing”); Afridi et al., supra note 10, at 7 (explaining that rural 
citizens are unequal to urban citizens because of the inequalities in job opportunity and social 
benefits that result in social segregation in the cities of the migrant population). 
40. See Windrow & Guha, supra note 20, at 1 (stating that the economic reform since 
1978 reoriented the country’s “once-Soviet style planned economy toward the market”); Yifu 
Lin, supra note 20, at 1 (noting the beginning of China’s market-oriented reforms in 1978). 
41. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 20 (arguing that migration in China will continue to 
flow from the rural sector to the urban sector in response to higher wages until a turning point 
is reached when surplus rural labor is fully absorbed in urban industries); Windrow & Guha, 
supra note 20, at 1 (“millions of rural Chinese have abandoned their plows to seek their 
fortunes in the city”). 
42. See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 180 (“the hukou system and the related 
population immobility are considered to be creating economic irrationalities”); CHINA 
LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (explaining that hukou restrictions on internal migration 
were counter-productive to economic development); see also Zhang, supra note 24, at 1442 
(describing reasons for the gradual reform to the hukou system beginning in the early 1980s); 
Goodburn, supra note 19, at 3 (explaining why the cheap labor of migrant workers was 
necessary for the growth of the economy).   
43. See Brian Holland, Migrant Children, Compulsory Education and the Rule of Law in 
China, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 215 (2008) (noting the increased demand for cheap 
labor in urban centers); Shuang Chen et al., supra note 25, at 697 (describing China’s 
economic conditions, which created a need for cheap labor); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra 
note 13 (explaining that cities needed cheap labor as the economic reforms of the 1980s took 
place).  
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experienced one of the greatest popular migrations in history.44 
Hundreds of millions of people from rural areas of the country rushed 
to the cities to seek jobs in manufacturing and construction.45  
In 2013 there were about 269 million migrant workers in 
China.46 Altogether, migrants make up about one third of China’s 
total urban population.47 Migrant workers are primarily employed in 
the service industry or in physically demanding jobs such as 
construction work, manual labor, or textile and garment factory 
work—work that legal urban residents are reluctant to do.48 Migrant 
workers are useful to the urban economy because they are willing to 
do the jobs that legal urban residents will not.49   
Despite the fact that migrant workers form a critical component 
of the urban economy, they remain socially “invisible” in the cities 
                                                            
44. See Mingqiong Zhang et al., supra note 24, at 1437 (“China has been experiencing 
the largest, sustained city-oriented migration in human history.”); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, 
supra note 13 (describing the 1990s migration from rural to urban areas as one of the greatest 
human migrations of all time); see also 2 WING-WAH LAW, CITIZENSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP 
EDUCATION IN A GLOBAL AGE  21 (A.C. (Tina) Besley, et al. eds., 2011) (“Post Mao reform 
led to a massive inflow of peasants from rural to urban areas”). 
45. See CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (describing the mass migration); 
Larson, supra note 24 (describing mass migration to the cities for employment opportunities); 
see also Josephs, supra note 36, at 299 (stating that the rural population found the opportunity 
to earn money in the cities very attractive). 
46. National Bureau of Statistics of China, supra note 13 (stating in 2013 there were 
268.94 million migrant workers); Report Says 269 Million Migrant Workers in 2013, CCTV 
(Feb. 21, 2014), http://english.cntv.cn/program/china24/20140221/100766.shtml (reporting 
that The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security’s latest statistics showed 269 
million migrant workers in 2013). Migrant workers are mostly in their late teens to early 
thirties. YOUNG, supra note 12, at 51; Zai Liang & Zhongdong Ma, China’s Floating 
Population: New Evidence from the 2000 Census, 30 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 467, 481 
Table 4 (2004). 
47. CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13  (explaining that migrants currently make 
up about one third of the total urban population); see Kam Wing Chan, Crossing the 50 
Percent Population Rubicon: Can China Urbanize to Prosperity?, 53 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY 
& ECON. 63, 68-69 (2012) (calculating the migrant population as the difference between the de 
facto urban population and the urban hukou population). 
48. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 51 (explaining that migrant workers are employed in 
the services industry or doing manual labor that urban residents would not do); Daniel Fu 
Keung Wong et al., Rural Migrant Workers in Urban China: Living a Marginalised Life, 16 
INT’L J. OF SOC. WELFARE 32, 34 (2007) (stating that migrants work in the services industry or 
in physically laborious jobs). 
49. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 51; Kenneth D. Roberts, Rural Migrants in Urban 
China: Willing Workers, Invisible Residents, ASIA PAC. BUS. REV., July 30, 2002, at 141, 146 
(explaining that migrants work jobs with low salaries and long, hard hours, and which 
residents do not want to do, including manual labor jobs like construction and manufacturing).  
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and experience immense discrimination.50 This is partially because 
migrants achieve much lower education levels and are therefore 
ineligible to work as high-skilled laborers.51 Further, rural migrants 
remain “institutionalized outsiders” in the cities where they work and 
pay taxes but are not registered, and, because of limited economic 
opportunities, they are restricted to a lower socioeconomic status with 
limited opportunity for social mobility.52  
Once it became apparent that tight restrictions on mobility of the 
migrant population became counterproductive in light of the 
economic reforms, the Chinese government recognized the need to 
change its attitude about migration to further their economic goals.53 
In a 2001 article, the Chinese government newspaper, Renmin Ribao 
(People’s Daily) reported the following about China’s economic 
reform on the migrant population: 
While restricting population mobility, the hukou system also 
restricts China’s economic development and further intensifies 
the urban-rural gap . . . . It is extremely incompatible with the 
current economic development of China, and has to a great extent 
                                                            
50. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 51, 56; FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 183 (“the 
key problem of the PRC hukou system has been its creation and maintenance of inequality and 
discrimination among the people”); Roberts, supra note 49, at 155 (arguing that migrant 
workers are “invisible residents” because they live and work separately from local residents, 
have an inferior status to local residents requiring them to maintain a low profile, yet perform 
critical jobs in the cities).  
51. Migrant workers on average have much lower education levels than local urban 
residents, and therefore, are less qualified to work in high-skilled jobs. See YOUNG, supra note 
12, at 55; Roberts, supra note 49, at 145; CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, CHINA’S 
HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION SYSTEM: SUSTAINED REFORM NEEDED TO PROTECT CHINA’S 
RURAL MIGRANTS, 10 (Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON CHINA] (“Educational 
opportunities are similarly skewed, limiting the upward mobility of rural residents and 
migrants.”).  
52. Juhua Yang, Social Exclusion and Young Rural-Urban Migrants’ Integration into a 
Host Society in China, 648 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 55 (July 2013) 
(explaining that the hukou system and public institutions still exclude outsiders from public 
benefits and resources and act as “fundamental barriers for migrants’ integration into the host 
society”); see YOUNG, supra note 12, at 60 (explaining that the migrants occupy a low 
socioeconomic position and are subject to discrimination); Weiping Wu & Emily Rosenbaum, 
Migration and Housing: Comparing China with the United States, in URBAN CHINA IN 
TRANSITION 250, 255 (John R. Logan ed., 2008) (“The system of hukou has institutionalized 
this local-non-local divide and exerted a profound impact on China’s migrants.”).  
53. See Zhong Zhao, Migration, Labor Market Flexibility, and Wage Determination in 
China, 43 DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 285, 287 (2005) (explaining that while the basics of the 
hukou system remain intact, some provinces and cities are starting to reform it in order to 
accommodate increasing need for cheap migrant labor); see also FEI-LING WANG, supra note 
6, at 183 (explaining that the hukou system has a great negative impact on China’s economy). 
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damaged China’s image of reform and opening . . . . To abolish 
the existing hukou system is inevitable, as the market economy 
demands population mobility and migration, and China needs to 
have a more liberal image.54 
While the government has made minor reforms to this system since 
its reinstatement such as eliminating food rations and modifying 
regulation of hukou transfers, rural citizens are still widely 
marginalized and their urban counterparts consider them inferior in 
terms of legal, civil, and political citizenship.55  
While parents are the ones making the difficult life-altering 
decision to migrate to urban areas, children can only passively accept 
the ramifications of these choices.56 Literature on the topic typically 
discusses two main categories of children of migrant workers: those 
who migrate to the cities with their parents, and those left behind in 
the countryside.57 “Migrant children” are children with rural hukous 
who migrate to urban China with their parents.58 These children have 
                                                            
54. FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 182 (quoting the author from the People’s daily 
newspaper). 
55. Migrant workers are outsiders, segregated from the local urban population; the local 
urban population portray migrants as outsiders, treat them poorly at work, discriminate against 
them because of their low socio-economic status, and blame them for increases in crime in the 
cities. See WING-WAH LAW, supra note 44, at 21; Jian Guan & Li Liu, Recasting Stigma as a 
Dialogical Concept: A Case Study of Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China, 24 J. CMTY. & 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 75, 76 (2014) (“They often experience much discrimination 
because of their low socio-economic status . . . Stigma has thus a great impact on the various 
aspects of rural-to-urban migrants’ lives.”). 
56. Aris Chan, supra note 30, at 57 (“Children, however, can only passively accept the 
choices made by their parents and often suffer more than them [sic] in terms of psychological 
harm as well as economic and social deprivation.”); see, e.g., Andrew Browne, Left-Behind 
Children of China’s Migrant Workers Bear Grown-Up Burdens, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304173704579260900849637692 (stating 
that about 61 million Chinese children are left behind without seeing their parents for months, 
or even years, because their parents chose to migrate to cities in search of employment). 
57. See, e.g., HOLLY H. MING, THE EDUCATION OF MIGRANT CHILDREN AND CHINA’S 
FUTURE: THE URBAN LEFT BEHIND 42 (2013) (defining the two distinct groups of migrant 
workers’ children: left-behind children and children who reside in the cities with their parents); 
YOUNG, supra note 12, at 52 (noting that some families migrate together to the cities while 
other families cannot take their children with them due to employment, financial or schooling 
constraints); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (providing information about migrant 
children and left-behind children); see also Kenneth D. Roberts, Female Labor Migrants to 
Shanghai: Temporary “Floaters” or Potential Settlers?, 36 INT’L MIGRATION REV., 2-3 
(2002) (describing women who brought their children with them to the city and who are 
generally staying longer in the cities). 
58. See Ran Zhang, China, in THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 45, 50 (Charles 
J. Russo et al. eds., 2007) (defining migrant children as children from the countryside living in 
2015] "ONE EXAM DETERMINES ONE'S LIFE" 1487 
little access to social welfare services such as healthcare, education, 
and housing because they are not registered at their urban addresses.59 
In 2013, estimated ranged from sixteen million to nineteen million 
migrant workers’ children living throughout the country outside of 
their hukou registration area.60  
The second category is the “left-behind children.”61 These are 
children who remain in the countryside, in the care of grandparents, 
on their own, or as physical laborers, while their parents migrate to 
cities.62 In 2010, there were about sixty-one million children below 
eighteen years old “left behind.”63 Left-behind children are often 
separated from their parents for a year or more.64 
C. 2014 Hukou Reform: Promote Limited Migration to Urban 
Towns and Cities By 2020 Based on City Size 
As of 2014, the core of the hukou system adopted in 1938 
remains in effect.65 In July of 2014, China’s State Council published a 
                                                                                                                                     
cities with migrant-worker parents); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (describing 
migrant children as children who live in urban areas but possess rural hukous). 
59. See Caroline Watson, Developing the Potential of Migrant Workers in China, CHINA 
OUTLOOK (JULY 10, 2014), http://china-outlook.net/essays/developing-the-potential-of-
migrant-workers-in-china/ (explaining that migrant children have little access to social services 
when they live outside of their hukou zones); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 
(explaining why migrant children have little access to social services in the cities). 
60. See Amanda Brown-Inz, View from the Media: College Entrance Exam Woes for 
Migrant Children, CHINA DEV. BRIEF (Feb. 22, 2013) (estimating sixteen million migrant 
workers’ children living throughout the country outside of their hukou registration area), 
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/?p=1862; see also Aris Chan, supra note 30, at 5 
(approximating nineteen million migrant workers’ children living with their parents in major 
cities outside of their hukou registration area). 
61. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 52 (defining left-behind children); Aris Chan, supra 
note 30, at 7.  
62. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 52 (describing left-behind children); CHINA LABOUR 
BULLETIN, supra note 13 (defining left-behind children).  
63. CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (describing the lifestyle of left behind 
children); see Liu Qiang, China’s Left-Behind Children Lag Behind, CHINA.ORG.CN (Aug. 9, 
2013) http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-08/09/content_29672476.htm (estimating 60 
million children are left behind in the countryside).    
64. See CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (explaining that left-behind children 
are often separated from their parents for extended periods of time); Aris Chan, supra note 30, 
at 9 (stating that children are often separated from their parents for years on end); see also 
YOUNG, supra note 12, at 52 (explaining that left-behind children see their parents on only 
rare occasions like the Chinese New Year).   
65. See Ming Lu & Guanghua Wan, Urbanization and Urban Systems in the People’s 
Republic of China: Research Findings and Policy Recommendations, 28 J. Econ. Surveys 671, 
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circular on reforms to the system out of recognition of the 
discrimination and inequalities that migrant workers and their 
children face while living in urban areas.66 The goal of this reform is 
to allow approximately 100 million people without urban hukous to 
settle in towns and cities by 2020.67 This reform removes all 
limitations on transferring a rural hukou to an urban hukou in small 
cities, relaxes restrictions in medium-sized cities, and sets new 
qualifications for large cities.68 According to Xinhua, the People’s 
Republic of China’s official press agency, this reform ends “the 
system which has divided the nation into rural and urban populations 
since the 1950s” and will greatly benefit migrant workers.69  
Scholars express that these guidelines will not make it any easier 
for migrants to settle in major cities like Beijing and Shanghai; the 
system for moving to major cities remains virtually unchanged.70 The 
2014 policy establishes a uniform household registration system that 
does not distinguish between rural (“agricultural”) and urban (“non-
agricultural”).71 Instead, every Chinese citizen will have a “resident’s 
hukou,” registered to his or her place of birth.72 Migrants will then 
have the opportunity to apply for a temporary residence permit in the 
                                                                                                                                     
671 (2014) (explaining that the hukou system “remains in effect today”); Goodburn, supra 
note 19, at 3 (noting the continuation of the hukou system today).  
66. See 2014 Hukou Reform, supra note 22; Goodburn, supra note 19, at 1 (explaining 
the circular on the end of the hukou system).  
67. 2014 Hukou Reform, supra note 22; see Arnold Hou, “Hukou” Reform to Help 
Millions Settle in Cities, ALL-CHINA WOMEN’S FEDERATION (July 30, 2014), http://www.
womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/news/china/17/4755-1.htm (stating the goal of the 
2014 hukou reform). 
68. Hou, supra note 67 (stating the reform will remove all limitations on transferring a 
rural hukou to an urban hukou in small cities); see FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 180 
(explaining that in 2005, already noticed the government relaxed control of internal migration 
in small cities); Goodburn, supra note 19, at 1 (explaining details of the reform).  
69. Mu Xuequan, Hukou Reforms to Help 100 Million Chinese, XINHUA (July 30, 2014), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/30/c_133520576.htm?_ga=1.248236999.
1905717420.1407510463 (describing the hukou reform); see Goodburn, supra note 19, at 1 
(reporting that the circular calls for the end of the rural-urban divide).   
70. See Goodburn, supra note 19, at 4 (explaining that different guidelines for various 
city sizes will prevent most rural migrants acquiring local hukou in China’s 14 most important 
cities); Lockett, supra note 29 (pointing out that even with this new reform to the hukou 
system it remains as difficult to migrate to cities of over 5 million people; migrants “cannot 
move where they want to move, they can only move where they don’t want to move”). 
71. See Goodburn, supra note 19, at 3 (noting the end to the rural-urban distinction); 
Hou, supra note 67 (noting the reform got rid of the distinction between rural and urban 
residents). 
72. See Goodburn, supra note 19, at 3 (explaining the new classification system); 
Lockett, supra note 29 (noting the end to the rural-urban distinction). 
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place where they live, giving them equal rights with locals in basic 
healthcare and education.73 Depending on how long they hold the 
temporary residence permit, migrants will be able to apply for a local 
hukou.74 
The hukou system plays a huge role in every government-
provided service, including education.75 It creates multiple 
institutional barriers to education and thus restricts the level and 
quality of education each child can access at every stage of 
education.76 In 2014, the State Council circulated a gaokao reform, 
which attempted to abolish some of the major institutional barriers to 
education.77 However, without a major overhaul of the hukou system, 
as opposed to the gaokao, it will be nearly impossible to achieve 
further levels of equality between urban and migrant students.78 
II. INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO EDUCATION & THE 2014 
GAOKAO REFORM 
The Ministry of Education administers China’s state-run public 
education system.79 The educational system relies on multiple legal 
documents including the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China, national statutes, State Council regulations, and local 
legislation.80 Although China’s Constitution and national statutes 
                                                            
73. See 2014 Hukou Reform, supra note 22 (stating that those who move to a new 
location outside of their hukou designated area can apply for a residence permit in that location 
after living there for half a year or more); Goodburn, supra note 19, at 3-4 (explaining the 
changes to the hukou system). 
74. See 2014 Hukou Reform, supra note 22 (“Eligible residence permit holders can 
apply to register for permanent residence in the location of their residence.”); Goodburn, supra 
note 19, at 4 (explaining the changes to the hukou system including allowing residents to apply 
for a local hukou). 
75. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
76. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
77. See infra Part II.B.  
78. See CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (arguing that the government should 
delink the hukou system and social services in order to allow all children living in the same 
city to have access to the same rights to educational services); see also Wang & Holland, 
supra note 36, at 472 (“in today’s China, migrant children will suffer from inequitable 
educational opportunities and conditions, which is a direct result of the barriers imposed upon 
them by the household registration (hukou) system”). 
79. Further Education in China, ASSOC. COLLEGES 1 (May 16, 2011), 
http://www.aoc.co.uk/sites/default/files/Country_Guide_China.pdf; Education System China: 
The Chinese Education System Described and Compared with the Dutch System, EP-NUFFIC 5 
(Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.nuffic.nl/en/library/education-system-china.pdf. 
80. Ran Zhang, Education Law in China, in YEARBOOK OF EDUC. 287, at 288 (Charles J. 
Russo ed., 2011)(explaining the legal basis of China’s education system); Xu Zhao & Robert 
1490 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1473 
guarantee all citizens equal education, like all other government 
services in China, education is still tied to one’s hukou, making it 
extremely difficult for rural citizens to access education because there 
are fewer opportunities available to them.81 
Part II outlines the institutional barriers that migrant children 
face in accessing education. First, it demonstrates how the Chinese 
government uses institutional exclusion to organize an unevenly 
developed nation.82 Second, this Part discusses the goals and the 
content of the 2014 changes to the gaokao system. 
A. Institutional Barriers to Education for Migrant Children 
Migrant children’s right to equal educational opportunities is a 
hotly debated issue in China.83 As a result of the restrictive hukou 
system, China has created a huge gap in educational opportunities 
between migrant students living in the cities and students from 
cities.84 Thus, quality education remains out of reach for migrant 
                                                                                                                                     
L. Selman, Combatting the Effects of Academic Stress in Chinese Schools, CHINA OUTLOOK 
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://china-outlook.net/essays/1201-2/ (explaining that despite the promise of 
equal education for all, education is limited by the hukou system).  
81. XIANFA art. 4, 46 (1982) (China) (stating that all citizens are equal;  citizens have the 
“duty as well as the right to receive education”); Goodburn, supra note 19, at 3; Wang & 
Holland, supra note 36, at 472 (although the Constitution states that all citizens in China are 
equal before the law and that all citizens have the duty and the right to education, a citizen’s 
hukou is still determinative of the level of education he actually receives).  
82. See China’s Household Registration (Hukou) System: Discrimination and Reforms: 
Roundtable before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 109th Cong., 1st Session, at 9 (Sept. 2, 
2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg24019/html/CHRG-109hhrg
24019.htm (discussing institutional exclusionary tactics that China utilizes to discriminate 
against rural migrants); FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 114 (arguing that the hukou system 
has created imbalances and waste in the Chinese economy). 
83. See Ran Zhang, supra note 58, at 50 (“Perhaps the most controversial issue about 
equal educational opportunity in China is the right to education of migrant children.”); HOLLY 
H. MING, supra note 57, at 42 (“The term ‘migrant workers children’ frequently makes the 
headlines in Chinese newspapers these days, and never fails to provoke contentious debate.”); 
see, e.g., John Ruwitch, Plight of Teen Prompts Education Debate, Protest in China, REUTERS 
(Dec. 22, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/22/us-china-migrants-idUSBRE8BL0
3T20121222 (noting that there has been debate about migrant children’s right to education; 
“For as long as there have been migrants after market reforms started more than three decades 
ago there have been complaints about the hukou system’s inadequacies.”). 
84. Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 472 (describing the education opportunity gap 
between rural and urban areas);  Law & Pan, supra note 23, at 360 (stating that the hukou 
system skews educational opportunities leaving migrant children lagging behind their local 
counterparts). 
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families.85 Further, rural students cannot compete academically with 
their urban counterparts because of the drastic income gap between 
rural and urban areas and fewer resources available to rural students.86 
Education represents one of the only paths toward, and the most 
important mechanism for, upward social mobility in China.87 This is 
because the local governments in cities will often sponsor urban 
hukous for rural students who are admitted to universities in that city, 
and students additionally have the chance to get a high-ranking job 
within that area after college thus qualifying for an urban hukou.88 
There are four key hukou-related institutional barriers to 
education.89 First, migrant students cannot receive compulsory 
education in the cities because public education is tied to local hukous 
and migrant children are not registered in cities.90 Second, funding is 
based on the population of legal urban residents, so there is not 
adequate funding to provide schooling for the illegal and unregistered 
migrant students.91 Third, all students must attend high school in the 
place of registration on their hukou which is inherited – therefore, 
even if a migrant student was born and raised in a city, the student 
must return to their family hometown for high school.92 Fourth, the 
government sets point cutoffs based on geographic location, making it 
                                                            
85. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 43, at 214 (arguing that urban residents enjoy a higher 
quality of education than rural residents); Jing Liu & W. James Jacob, From Access to Quality: 
Migrant Children’s Education in Urban China, 12 EDUC. RES. POL’Y PRAC. 177, 184 (2012) 
(“Teacher participants also voiced concerns regarding the hukou system and the quality of 
migrant children’s education.”); Rudolph, supra note 18 (stating that migrant children do not 
receive quality education). 
86. See Holland, supra note 43, at 225 (“China’s worsening state of social and economic 
inequality is perhaps nowhere more keenly illustrated than in the primary and secondary 
schools of the nation's capital.”); Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 472 (stating that rural 
students are unable to compete academically with urban students). 
87. See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 139 (education in college is one of the main 
avenues for upward socioeconomic mobility); YOUNG, supra note 12, at 55 (“One study found 
that only education, Party membership, and military service ‘facilitate hukou mobility’ for 
China’s agricultural hukou holders”); Law & Pan, supra note 23, at 361 (arguing equal 
educational opportunity to access education is an important means of upward social mobility).   
88. See Gaoming Zhang, supra note 154, at 268 (“Getting enrolled in a university and/or 
getting a job in a more prosperous area means the sponsorship for a new Hukou document in 
the prosperous area”); FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 139 (arguing that by passing the 
gaokao and earning a college degree, anyone can acquire an urban hukou).  
89. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.  
90. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
91. See infra notes 103-116 and accompanying text. 
92. See infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text. 
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much easier for students from cities to get into college than students 
from rural areas.93 
1. Migrant Students do not Have Access to Public Compulsory 
Education in the Cities Without Local Hukous  
It is the hukou that limits migrant children from accessing 
compulsory education in cities by requiring students to have local 
hukous to attend public schools.94 According to China’s Compulsory 
Education Law of 1986, revised in 2006, the first nine years of 
education are mandatory, consisting of six years of primary education 
and three years of middle school.95 This law provides all citizens the 
right to receive a basic education, regardless of ethnic background, 
gender, religious belief, or occupation.96 Despite the 2006 reform, 
China does not provide schooling to migrant students in the urban 
areas where they live because it limits funding for compulsory 
education to the areas where the child’s parents are originally from.97 
As the factors described herein demonstrate, despite the Compulsory 
Education Law, the nine years of compulsory education are not 
guaranteed for migrant children.98 
                                                            
93. See infra Part II.A.3.  
94. See Yi wu jiao yu fa (中华人民共和国义务教育法 [已被修订]) [Compulsory 
Education Law (revised)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Congress, April 
12, 1986, effective July 1, 1986) Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
Compulsory Education Law (revised)], available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/
display.aspx?lib=law&id=1166&CGid= (restricting school admissions by hukou). 
95.  Compulsory Education Law (revised), supra note 94, at arts. 5, 7; CHINA LABOUR 
BULLETIN, supra note 13 (explaining China’s compulsory education laws); see Law & Pan, 
supra note 23, at 341 (stating that China’s 1986 Basic Education Law provided for nine years 
of compulsory education); John N. Hawkins et al., Higher Education in China: Access, Equity 
and Equality, in 24 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 215, 220 (Donald B. Holsinger & W. James 
Jacob eds., 2009) (noting that there are six years of primary education and three years of 
middle school). 
96. Compulsory Education Law (revised), supra note 94, at art. 4; see Ran Zhang, supra 
note 80, at 290 (discussing the goals of the amendment). 
97. See Holland, supra note 43, at 241 (noting that charging student fees allows local 
governments and schools to raise additional funds for operational costs and even profit); 
YOUNG, supra note 12, at 59-60 (explaining that migrant children face institutionalized 
exclusion by their inability to receive government-funded compulsory education in the areas 
their parents are working).  
98. See Holland, supra note 43, at 210; Law & Pan, supra note 23, at 340; CHINA 
LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13; Aris Chan, supra note 30, at 34; Wang & Holland, supra 
note 36, at 471 (explaining that despite China’s implementation of the Compulsory Education 
Law, legislation has not completely eradicated educational inequalities in compulsory 
schooling). 
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There are multiple hurdles in the way of migrant students 
actually accessing compulsory education.99 First, migrant parents 
must produce five documents proving employment and temporary 
residency in the capital in order to access the education: temporary 
residence permits, work permits, proof of residence, certificates from 
their place of origin, and household registration booklets to apply to 
school for their children.100 Second, many schools request 
“donations,” which are really additional fees charged to migrant 
families for admission to the school.101 Thus, migrant children end up 
paying additional fees to attend local schools even though their 
families, as temporary hukou holders, already pay local taxes.102 
Migrant students are further institutionally excluded from 
accessing compulsory education because local education budgets are 
based on the number of students with local hukous rather than the 
total number of students enrolled in the local schools, which means 
that migrant children are excluded from budgetary calculations.103 
Since the early 2000s, the central government has placed the 
                                                            
99. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text. 
100. See Xiang Huilian, Government Again Cracks Down on Schools for Migrant 
Workers’ Children, CAIXINONLINE (Sept. 9, 2014), http://english.caixin.com/2014-09-09/1007
26559.html (stating the five documents necessary for migrant children to attend public 
schools); Jessica L. Montgomery, The Inheritance of Inequality: Hukou and Related Barriers 
to Compulsory Education for China's Migrant Children, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 591, 600 
(2012) (stating the five documents that migrant students must produce before gaining 
admission to public school); Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 481 (stating the five 
documents a migrant student must produce to attend public school).   
101. See CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (describing the required fees to 
attend public schools); Aris Chan, supra note 30, at 34-35 (describing the fee system); 
Montgomery, supra note 100, at 600 (explaining that schools often require large donations to 
admit migrant children); Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 481 (noting that a majority of 
survey respondents claimed to pay a fee per semester); see, e.g., Law & Pan, supra note 23, at 
360 (showing for example, in Guangzhou, migrant children were required to pay a school fee).  
102. FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 71, 78 (a temporary hukou is required for those 
living outside their permanent hukou zone for more than three days, and though they have no 
access to community-defined distribution of benefits like welfare, they are required to pay 
local taxes); Anita Chan, Exploitation of Migrant Workers in China’s Export Manufacturing 
Sector, LERA, http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/fall04-chan.html 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (“For local governments, admitting migrants can be lucrative. 
Migrant workers generate tax revenue by attracting companies that want cheap labor. At the 
same time, these localities have no responsibility for the welfare of the migrants, who are not 
eligible for any of the medical, housing or unemployment benefits available to local 
residents.”).  
103. Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 474 (stating that China’s local governments are 
responsible for managing and funding compulsory education despite budgeting based on 
children with local hukous); see Jianwen, supra note 11, at 79-80 (explaining that education 
funds are allocated according to the number of students with residence registrations). 
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responsibility on local urban centers to educate migrant children even 
though these migrant students do not possess the requisite local 
hukous; however, the local governments themselves do not accept this 
responsibility.104 Specifically, in 2004, the State Council expressed 
that migrant children should not be subjected to different admission 
requirements for compulsory education.105 The following year, the 
Ministry of Finance added that migrant children should not pay more 
than local students for the same education, specifically prohibiting 
collection of temporary student fees and school selection fees 
(“donations”).106 In 2008, the Ministry of Finance and the National 
Development and Reform Commission stated that they would abolish 
temporary student fees completely by 2009.107 
These policies place a tremendous burden on local governments 
with a high proportion of migrant students.108 Because these students 
are not counted, the urban local governments do not see it as their 
responsibility to provide funding to educate them and urban 
educational systems view migrant children as an added burden.109 The 
central government is urging cities to account for migrants in their 
budgets, and has asked the host cities and the migrants’ rural 
hometowns to share the costs of social services, including 
                                                            
104. See Decision of the State Council on the Development and Reform of Elementary 
Education (国务院关于基础教育改革与发展的决定), May 29, 2001; but see Aris Chan, 
supra note 30, at 49 (noting that local governments are responsible for providing education to 
migrant students despite their hukou statuses). 
105. Circular of the State Council on Further Improving the Conditions for Peasants 
Who Seek Employment in the Cities (国务院办公 厅关于进一步做好改善农民进城就业环
境工作的通知), 27 December 2004; Aris Chan, supra note 30, at 49 (noting the State 
Council’s goal of making admissions requirements equal for all students because of the reality 
that so many migrant students are not able to access compulsory education). 
106. Aris Chan, supra note 30, at 49 (stating that the State Council forbid public schools 
from collecting fees); FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 194 (urban schools charged migrant 
students hefty fees to keep them away). 
107. Guanyu Gongbu Quxiao He Tingzhi Zhengshou 100 Xiang Xingzheng Shiyexing 
Shoufei Xiangmu De Tongzhi (关于公布取消和停止征收100项行政事业性收
费项目的通知) [Notice to Cease the Levying of Administrative Fees 100 Projects] 
(promulgated by the Ministry Fin. and the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Nov. 13, 2008, 
effective Jan. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Abolish Temporary Student Fees]; see Aris Chan, supra 
note 30, at 49 (stating that various governmental bodies agreed to abolish student fees). 
108. See Abolish Temporary Student Fees, supra note 107; Aris Chan, supra note 30, at 
50 (abolishing fees places a financial burden on local governments). 
109. Compulsory Education Law (revised), supra note 94, art. 12 (2006); Wang & 
Holland, supra note 36, at 474; see Jianwen, supra note 11, at 79-80; Aris Chan, supra note 
30, at 54; Ran Zhang, supra note 80, at 290 (explaining that while migrants moved into urban 
areas, payments of educational funds did not, resulting in shortages of funds for the education 
of migrant children). 
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education.110 Despite this push, the government has not promulgated 
any substantial regulations to encourage a shift in funding to the host 
cities.111 Therefore, while all children are guaranteed equal education 
in China by law, access to compulsory education is hardly guaranteed 
to migrant students.112  
Fenghua, a city in Zhejiang Province, is a prime example of how 
even when a city wants to provide compulsory education to migrant 
students, the educational system prevents it from doing so.113 From 
2001 to 2002, Fenghua granted urban hukous to 13,000 former rural 
residents in an effort to take responsibility for all local residents.114 
The city government lost over 20 million Yuan RMB (approximately 
US$3.2 million) in additional school fees that they would have earned 
from migrant students with rural hukous, and had to come up with 
more money to expand schools to accommodate the new students.115 
If, like Fenghua, other cities grant more migrant workers urban 
hukous, the education bureau would not get the special fees paid by 
                                                            
110. See Aris Chan, supra note 30, at 54 (describing the shared budgeting between host 
cities and rural hometowns); Douglas J. Besharov & Karen Baehler, Prospects for China’s 
Migrant Workers, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS BLOG (Sept. 10, 2013), http://blog.oup.com/
2013/09/china-migrant-workers-hukou-social-policy/ (“The Chinese government introduced 
new policies in 2003 that tied responsibility for education delivery to the receiving jurisdiction 
rather than the district of origin and forbade the imposition of differential school fees based on 
household registration status.”). 
111. See Aris Chan, supra note 30, at 54 (noting the lack of legislation); Besharov, supra 
note 110 (explaining that while the government introduced new polices tying the responsibility 
for education to the receiving jurisdiction, these policies did not address the financing 
constraints of the receiving local governments and did not offer fiscal relief for local and 
municipal jurisdictions faced with large numbers of migrant students); A. Melander & K. 
Pelikanova, Reform of the Hukou System: A Litmus Test of the New Leadership, ECFIN ECON. 
BRIEF, July 2013, at 10 (“lack of incentives and financial capacity of local authorities to deal 
with extra-provincial migrants”). 
112. See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 197 (explaining the difficulties in providing 
all students in cities free education); Besharov, supra note 110 (describing the lack of 
budgeting for migrant students). 
113. See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 197 (explaining that cities cannot afford the 
immense inflow of migrants because of inadequate budgeting processes that ignore migrants). 
114. ALEXANDRA HARNEY, THE CHINA PRICE: THE TRUE COST OF CHINESE 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 116 (2008) (“Fenghua gave 13,000 select rural hukou holders 
urban hukou over a period of eight months in 2001 and 2002”); FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, 
at 197 (showing that Fenghua could not afford its decision to grant urban hukous to 13,000 
people).  
115.  HARNEY, supra note 114, at 116 (“$2.6 million in extra school fees these migrants 
were paying dried up overnight”); FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 197 (explaining how 
much money Fenghua lost when granting 13,000 urban hukous).  
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non-local residents, reducing the available resources for the system as 
a whole.116 
2. Migrant Students Must Attend Secondary Education in Their 
Hukou-Designated Place of Residence 
At the end of nine years of compulsory education, students have 
three choices for secondary education: high school (senior secondary 
school), vocational school, or enter the work force.117 In China, high 
school is three years long and is fee-based.118 Since China does not 
provide free high school education, migrant students (in addition to 
all rural students generally) are filtered out of the education system 
simply because they cannot afford the education.119   
Beyond financial constraints, the main institutional barrier to 
accessing secondary education is that students must attend high 
school where their hukou designates.120 This means that, even if a 
student has lived in a major city his or her whole life, and his or her 
entire family live in that city, that student still must return to their 
hukou for high school – often a long and expensive journey.121 A 
large number of migrant students who return home to study in high 
                                                            
116.  HARNEY, supra note 114, at 116 (“the hukou system provides too many benefits to 
the Chinese government—in terms of social control, economic development and governance—
ever to be allowed to disappear completely”); YOUNG, supra note 12, at 92 (“many argue that 
it is the associated cost of providing the same services to non-hukou residents as hukou 
residents and the lack of a funding stream for such reforms that increases the opposition local 
government officials have to proposals for greater reform”). 
117. See Emily Hannum et al., Examinations and Educational Opportunity in China: 
Mobility and Bottlenecks for the Rural Poor, 37 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 267, 270 (2011) for a 
discussion of the post-compulsory education landscape; see generally Education in China, 
CHINA HIGHLIGHTS, http://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/education.htm (last visited 
April 22, 2015).  
118. See Hannum, supra note 117, at 270 (briefly explaining the high school system in 
China); Hawkins, supra note 95, at 220 (stating the duration of high school in China). 
119. See Hannum, supra note 117, at 270 (explaining that since higher education is non-
compulsory, local areas set tuition and room and board fees commensurate with national 
policy and with costs); Chengfang Liu et al., Development Challenges, Tuition Barriers, and 
High School Education in China, 29 ASIA PAC. J. EDUC. 503, at 14 (2009) (“high school 
tuition/fees may constitute one of the greatest barriers for rural students to circumvent the 
quest to enter high school”). 
120. See Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 481 (stating that students are required to 
attend high school in their hometowns). 
121. See Liu & Jacob, supra note 85, at 7 (“Therefore, in order to continue schooling at 
the high school level, most migrant children must return to their hometown before or after they 
complete their junior high school education.”); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 
(explaining that migrant students typically have to attend high school in their designated hukou 
area). 
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school have trouble adapting to this new environment and simply 
drop out.122 
One of the most important purposes of Chinese high school 
education is to prepare students for the gaokao.123 By requiring 
migrant students to return to their hometowns to attend high school 
and sit for the gaokao, rural students are placed at a distinct 
disadvantage for a number of reasons.124 First, the quality of high 
school education in rural areas is much lower than in urban areas.125 
Second, each region sets its own curriculum for the gaokao, thus 
disadvantaging migrant students who spent their earlier years of 
education learning a different curriculum than that of their 
hometown.126 
3. Migrant Children are Unable to Access Tertiary Education 
Because of Harder Gaokao Cutoff Score 
Migrant children suffer from inequitable educational 
opportunities in tertiary education because of the barriers that the 
                                                            
122. CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (describing the difficulty that migrant 
children face in adjusting to their home environments after attending schools in cities); Zhijun 
Liu & Fangsheng Zhu, China’s Returned Migrant Children: Experiences of Separation and 
Adaptation, 12 ASIA PAC. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 445, 447 (2011) (describing the difficulty 
migrant students face when adapting back to their hometowns); see Han Jialing, Education for 
Migrant Children in China 8 (2009) commissioned by the Education for All Global Monitoring 
Report as background information to assist in drafting the 2010 report, U.N. Doc. 
2010/ED/EFA?MRT/PI/42 (2010) (noting that migrant students have to return to their 
hometown to go to school and adapt to studying in a new environment). 
123. You, supra note 7, at 310 (explaining that the gaokao drives Chinese K-12 
education into teaching and learning strictly to prepare for the gaokao); see Gaoming Zhang, 
supra note 14, at 268 (describing how Chinese students view the gaokao as deciding their 
entire future). 
124. Lin Jin, supra note 37, at 10 (“Even for those who manage to go on to high school, 
they are forced to return to their hometown to take the college entrance examination, which put 
[sic] them at a disadvantage”); see CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (describing the 
disadvantages of being a migrant student). 
125. See Chengfang Liu, supra note 119, at 14 (“The quality of rural education in China 
is far lower than education in China’s cities, where investment is higher;” this includes all 
aspects of schooling from the facilities to teachers’ abilities); Wu Chun-Xia, The Study on the 
Evolvement and Determinants of Urban-Rural Fiscal Expenditure Gap of Compulsory 
Education in China, Education Science, 1-5 (2007). 
126. See You, supra note 7, at 316 (showing that each province and municipality 
develops and customizes its own gaokao curriculum); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 
13 (explaining that decentralized curriculum design disadvantages migrant students); Wang & 
Holland, supra note 36, at 483 (explaining that different regions use different curriculum and 
textbooks, making it difficult to transition from one region to another). 
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hukou system creates.127 The gaokao governs as the sole entrance 
criteria for most universities.128 Rural Chinese students are at a great 
disadvantage when taking the gaokao as compared to their urban 
counterparts, and have much lower chances at gaining admissions to 
top tier universities.129 
Similar to the hukou system, the gaokao is one of the few paths 
for social mobility in China.130 The exam is only offered once a year, 
in early June.131 Due to the high-stakes nature of the gaokao, students 
spend most hours of every day throughout their middle and high-
school years preparing for the exam.132 Parents spend tremendous 
amounts of money and time selecting schools and tutors in order to 
put their children in the best position to succeed on the gaokao.133 The 
Ministry of Education sets two separate cutoff points for exam scores: 
a higher one for prestigious universities and a lower one for general 
university admission.134 Universities then select their incoming class 
                                                            
127. Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 472 (stating that the hukou system creates 
barriers to educational opportunities for migrant students).  
128. See Xinhua Sept. 2014, supra note 4 (describing the gaokao as the sole criteria for 
college admissions); Yiqi, supra note 7 (describing the gaokao as a path for upward social 
mobility); Jian Wang, supra note 4, at 169 (“score is the only criterion”); You, supra note 7, at 
309 (noting that the gaokao is the sole admissions criteria for Chinese universities).   
129. FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 140, 143 (when it comes to admissions the fair 
exam quickly becomes inherently unfair to applicants from rural and less developed regions 
because of the hukou system); see Prashant Loyalka et al., The Impacts of Building Elite High 
Schools for Students from Disadvantaged Areas 4 (Rural Educ. Action Project, Working Paper 
250, 2013), available at http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Impacts_attending_elite_high
_schools_for_poor_China2.pdf (“In our study’s context, students from poor areas in Northwest 
China have lagged behind students from non-poor areas in opportunities to attend college and 
elite colleges.”).  
130. See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 139 (by passing the gaokao and graduating 
from college, anyone can acquire an urban hukou, such that the chance to earn a college degree 
is the main hope for students from rural regions to legally change their hukou location and 
type); Gaoming Zhang, supra note 154, at 268 (arguing that the gaokao exists as one of the 
few paths, if not the only path, for social mobility); Law & Pan, supra note 23, at 361 (noting 
equal educational opportunity to access education is an important means of upward social 
mobility).   
131. See Lafraniere, supra note 4 (stating that the gaokao is only offered once a year); 
Yiqi, supra note 7 (noting the gaokao is offered once a year).   
132. Zhao & Selman, supra note 80; Lindsey Lucenta, China’s Higher Education Lacks 
Higher Learning, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Dec. 2011/Jan. 2012, at 76-77 (describing the 
preparation for the gaokao). 
133. See Zhao & Selman, supra note 80; FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 140 
(explaining that the gaokao brings parents’ lives to a standstill while their children prepare for 
the exam).    
134. The Ministry of Education is the agency of the State Council that regulates all 
aspects of education in China. Hannum, supra note 117, at 272 (explaining the system of two 
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from the pool of students who have achieved the minimum cutoff 
score.135  
The first major barrier to accessing tertiary education is that 
students must take the gaokao in their place of registration according 
to the hukou.136 Children of about 200 million migrant workers have 
to take the gaokao in their parents’ hometowns.137 There is currently a 
heated debate among Chinese citizens as to whether or not migrant 
students can take the gaokao in the place where they live and study, 
rather than where their hukou is registered.138  
The Outline of China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-
Term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020) provides that 
the State intends to explore ways to enable migrant students to take 
                                                                                                                                     
separate cutoff scores); see You, supra note 7, at 309-10 (“Since its debut in 1950, this test has 
been officially stipulated as the sole college admissions criteria for most of the time to ensure 
that only those who have reached the gaokao cut-off scores for higher institutions will be 
admitted”); Prashant Loyalka et al., The Effects of Attending Selective College Tiers in China, 
41 SOC. SCI. RES. 287, 287 (2012) (“Each year provincial governments usually set official tier 
eligibility cutoff scores based on the overall results on an annual college entrance exam so that 
only higher scoring students are eligible to attend higher tier institutions.”). 
135. See Jeff M. Smith, Chinese Students Face Off Against the Gaokao, AM. FOREIGN 
POL’Y COUNCIL (July 26, 2012), http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewBulletin/1627; 
You, supra note 7, at 312 (describing the gaokao as the equivalent to “college admissions per 
se” because candidates are admitted only if their gaokao results reach the cutoff point of the 
institution; the gaokao is the sole factor for admissions, colleges do not look at grades, 
admissions essays etc.). 
136. See Sun Zhao & Yao Chun, Gaokao Reform Significant for Enhancing Social 
Equity, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2014), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/09
05/c90882-8779543.html (stating that students must take the gaokao in their official place of 
residence according to the hukou system); Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 481 (stating that 
students must take the gaokao where their hukous are registered); Jiao Feng, supra note 120 
(arguing that one barrier to accessing tertiary education is that migrant students have to take 
the gaokao in their hukou designated area).  
137. Zhao & Chun, supra note 136; see Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 481 (noting 
that students have to take the gaokao in their place of registration); see Jiao Feng, supra note 
120, at 3. 
138. From the migrant students’ perspectives, by having to go to their registered home 
they must familiarize themselves with new materials that will be on the gaokao in their home 
province and they also face even fiercer competition where the gaokao cutoff score is much 
higher. Meanwhile, local urban residents do not want to increase the number of students taking 
the gaokao in the cities overall, as it would make it more difficult for a local urban student to 
access the top universities. See Gaoming Zhang, supra note 154, at 269 (“The biggest debate 
of the Gaokao reform nowadays is whether or not a migrant student can take the Gaokao in the 
place he lives and studies”); Luo Wangshu & Jin Zhu, Moves to Change Gaokao Rules Spark 
Heated Debate, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 24, 2013), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-
01/24/content_16169927.htm (arguing that because the policies sparked protests “the new 
gaokao rules were issued in 2012 as a major effort by the central government to provide equal 
rights in education and matriculation opportunities for those children”). 
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the gaokao in the city where their parents work and live.139 Further, in 
August 2012, the State Council forwarded a circular from the 
Ministry of Education asking each province to implement a plan for 
migrant students taking college entrance exams locally by the end of 
2012.140 While there have been more attempts to modify existing 
restrictions on migrant students’ access to tertiary education—some 
migrant students can now sit for the exam in the city where they 
live—the threshold for eligibility is high, making this reform 
essentially “worthless.”141  
Second, admissions quotas for universities are also linked to the 
hukou system, clearly favoring the major urban centers over the rural 
provinces.142 Rather than distributing the quotas based on the size of 
the applicant pool in each province, the distribution is heavily based 
on where the colleges are located, reserving more places for students 
with a local hukou than for those with a hukou elsewhere.143 Regional 
                                                            
139. See Outline of China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-Term Education 
Reform and Development (2010-2020) (July 29, 2010) [hereinafter Long-Term Education 
Reform Plan]; Xiong Bingqi, Enabling Migrant Workers’ Children to Take the College 
Entrance Exam in the City Where Their Parents Work and Live Moving Forward, in 2 
CHINESE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE ON EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 108-09 (Yang Dongping 
ed., 2014) (discussing China’s consideration of allowing migrant students to take the gaokao 
where they live); Jiao Feng, supra note 120, at 4. 
140. Circular of the State Council: Opinions on Enabling Children of Migrant Workers 
to Take the College Entrance Examination in the City Where Their Parents Work and Live 
After Completing Compulsory Education (国务院办公厅转发教育部等部门关于做好进城
务工人员随迁子女接受义务教育后在当地参加升学考试工作意见的通知) (promulgated 
by the St. Council, Aug. 30, 2012). 
141. CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, supra note 13 (arguing that despite reform attempts, the 
high threshold for eligibility makes any concessions effectively worthless); see, e.g., Fang 
Yang, Chongqing Lifts Exam Ban for Migrant Workers’ Children, XINHUA (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/21/c_132056190.htm (explaining that 
children of migrant workers can become eligible to sit for the gaokao where they live based on 
school grades, the number of years that their parents have worked in the city, their family 
property in Shanghai and years of social security payments by their families). 
142. FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 141-43; Wang & Holland, supra note 36, at 472; 
COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 51, at 10 (“The Ministry of Education employs a strict 
system of hukou-based quotas to allocate available spaces for college admission. These quotas 
are biased in favor of the residents of large cities.”); see Wu Yuxiao, supra note 16, at 67 (“In 
China, where educational resources differ considerably between rural and urban areas, 
household registration status is an important factor weighing on educational attainment.”); 
Gaoming Zhang, supra note 14, at 269 (explaining that universities set different cutoff scores 
for applicants from different locations such that by taking the gaokao in a certain location the 
test-taker may earn a greater chance of admission). 
143. See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 140-41 (explaining the college admissions 
quota system); Yiqin Fu, China’s Unfair College Admissions System, THE ATLANTIC (June 19, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/chinas-unfair-college-admissions-
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admission quotas are classified as a State secret, and some scholars 
argue that this is to mask the inequity of the admissions process.144 
In addition to geographical quotas, other factors make it difficult 
for migrant students to access tertiary education.145 China does not 
treat all provinces equally under the college admissions system, 
instead favoring certain areas mandating a lower minimum admission 
score than in other areas for the same college spot in addition to 
favoring certain ethnicities and parents’ occupations.146 Each of the 
thirty-one provincial level college admissions offices announces the 
local minimum admission scores after the gaokao is completed.147 
                                                                                                                                     
system/276995/ (“universities located in Beijing will reserve more spots for students with 
Beijing hukou, and thus the lowest qualifying score for a Beijing-based test-taker may be 
vastly lower than the score required from a student taking the examination in Henan or 
Jiangsu.”); see, e.g., COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 51, at 10 (“A Chinese student with a 
Beijing hukou can score nearly 150 points lower than a rural Chinese student in Shandong 
province (on a test with a maximum score of 750), but the former can still receive a college 
admission slot while the latter is refused.”).  
144. See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 141 (“details of regional admissions quotas 
and the breakdown of the origins of college students in China are classified as a state secret, 
for good reason”); see also Yiqin Fu, supra note 143 (“setting quotas proportional to the 
number of test-takers would be systematic justice, and favoring students from poorer provinces 
in central China would be restorative justice, yet the current system could be described only in 
terms of its absurdity.”). 
145. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 60 (“Depending on the location of the exam, different 
scores are required to attend the best universities.”); Hannum, supra note 117, at 276 (“Within 
China, different cut-off scores are required for different provinces”); Gaoming Zhang, supra 
note 14, at 269 (“required admission scores from the same university are different for test-
takers in different places across the country”). 
146. See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 145 (explaining how some students are 
favored over others based on location); YOUNG, supra note 12, at 60 (explaining that the 
gaokao scoring system favors students from specific locations); Hannum, supra note 117, at 
276 (stating that the admissions process takes an applicant’s place of residence into account); 
Gaoming Zhang, supra note 14, at 269 (“taking the Gaokao in a certain place (usually a more 
prosperous area such as Beijing or Shanghai) may benefit the test-takers a much greater chance 
for higher education, even with the same test score.”); Barry Sautman, Affirmative Action, 
Ethnic Minorities and China’s Universities, 7 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 77, 99–101 (1998) 
(explaining that the passing gaokao score varies based on a number of factors, and describing 
these factors).  
147. FEI-LING WANG, supra note 6, at 143 (describing the process); Prashant Loyalka, 
supra note 129, at 291 (“After students take the province-wide college entrance exam in early 
June, each provincial government grades the exams and publishes a list of tier eligibility score 
cutoffs based on the overall score distribution and student quotas within each tier.”); see 
Hannum, supra note 117, at 272 (“the Ministry of Education determines two cut-off points for 
exam scores, based on the quantity of university places and the number of applications.”). 
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B. The 2014 Gaokao Reform: Goals and Content 
 On September 4, 2014 the State Council announced the 
largest reform to the gaokao since its reintroduction in 1977 at the end 
of the Cultural Revolution.148 The reform is called “The 
Implementation Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Examination 
and Enrollment System.”149 The State Council expects the reform to 
be fully implemented by 2020.150 On December 16, 2014, China’s 
Education Ministry emphasized its plan to reform China’s current 
college entrance system by creating a more holistic admissions 
process looking at supplemental factors, such as high school grades, 
in addition to the gaokao score.151 The State Council set two main 
overarching goals for the 2014 reform of the gaokao: “[f]irst, 
narrowing the gap between admissions of rural and urban students to 
all universities, and second, addressing the larger inequalities in 
admissions to elite universities.”152  
The State Council’s first mission of the reform is to increase the 
college admission rate in Midwestern provinces and populous 
provinces, and the numbers of students from rural areas in key 
universities.153 In order to achieve this goal, the reform first increases 
enrollment quotas for students from the less developed central and 
western parts of China, and other populous regions.154 Next, the 
                                                            
148. See Shen Qing, China Voice: Gaokao Reform Significant for Enhancing Social 
Equity, XINHUA (Sept. 5, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
09/05/c_133624107.htm (reporting reforms to the gaokao); Sun Zhao, supra note 136; see also 
Lu Hui, China to Overhaul Exam, Enrollment System by 2020, XINHUA, Sept. 4, 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/04/c_133621112.htm (reporting the gaokao 
reform).    
149. Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2. 
150. See Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2; Lu Hui, supra note 148 (describing 
the timeline for the gaokao reform).  
151. See Xu Heqian, Government Fleshes Out Reform to Gaokao System, CAIXIN (Dec. 
19, 2014) http://english.caixin.com/2014-12-19/100765295.html (reporting the Education 
Ministry’s plans to implement the reform); China Focus: College Entrance Exam Reform to 
Take Focus Off Score Results, XINHUA (Dec. 16, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2014-12/16/c_133859432.htm (reporting on the Education Ministry’s announcement). 
152. Beauchamp-Mustafaga, supra note 2 (stating the State Council’s two main goals for 
the gaokao reform); see Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2.  
153. Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2; Beauchamp-Mustafaga, supra note 2 
(describing the first goal of the gaokao reform).  
154. See Sun Zhao, supra note 136; The Problems with the “Revolutionary” Gaokao 
Reforms, CHINA OUTLOOK (Sept. 7, 2014), http://china-outlook.net/blogs/the-problems-with-
the-revolutionary-gaokao-reforms/ (explaining the changes to the quota system); Xinhua Sept. 
2014, supra note 4 (reporting measures to level the playing field between regional inequalities 
2015] "ONE EXAM DETERMINES ONE'S LIFE" 1503 
reform aims to improve the provision of primary and secondary 
education to migrant children.155 Neither the State Council nor the 
Ministry of Education has released any specifics about the reformed 
quota system and changes at the primary and secondary levels of 
education.156 
The second goal of addressing inequalities in admissions to elite 
universities is aimed at creating a fairer and transparent gaokao 
system.157 The State Council wants to eliminate the exam-focused 
nature of students by decreasing the emphasis placed on the gaokao 
subjects, thus avoiding the single-minded mentality that the gaokao 
creates.158 Moreover, the State Council aims to reduce the pressures 
of the exam by splitting up the multiple parts into different time 
periods.159 The reform states specific changes to the current system in 
order to achieve this goal, for example, students will no longer earn 
extra gaokao points for sporting or artistic achievements.160 Further, 
each elite university will have its own admissions procedures in 
which students must partake after completing the gaokao.161  
The State Council has recognized the importance of modernizing 
the gaokao system to promote equality across the country and assist 
                                                                                                                                     
including adjusting enrollment quotas to increase recruitment of students from central, western 
and very populous regions).  
155.  Beauchamp-Mustafaga, supra note 2 (stating the State Council’s goal of improving 
primary and secondary education); see Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2. 
156. See Beauchamp-Mustafaga, supra note 2 (articulating that the State Council did not 
state any specifics regarding how it plans to improve the quality of primary and secondary 
education); cf. Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2 (lacking any specificities about the 
plan to reform the quota system and change the primary and secondary education systems).  
157. See Lu Hui, supra note 148 (expressing the State Council’s goal to increase fairness 
and transparency); Sun Zhao, supra note 136 (describing the State Council’s goal to increase 
transparency of the gaokao); Xinhua Sept. 2014, supra note 4 (reporting that China plans to 
overhaul the gaokao system in order to improve fairness and transparency).   
158. Shi Rui & Liu Jiaying, Reform Plan Aims to Cut Importance of National College 
Exam, CAIXIN (Sept. 5, 2014), http://english.caixin.com/2014-09-05/100725828.html 
(describing the State Council’s goal to eliminate the exam-focused nature of Chinese students); 
see Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2.  
159. See Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2; Yiqi, supra note 7 (explaining the 
State Council’s goal to decrease the pressure that Chinese students feel because of the gaokao).  
160. See The Problems with the “Revolutionary” Gaokao Reforms, supra note 154 
(stating that students will no longer receive extra points for extracurricular activities); Rui & 
Jiaying, supra note 158 (explaining that there will be no more extra points on the gaokao for 
extracurricular activities); Jiang Xueqin, Opinion: China’s Education Arms Race, CNN (Sept. 
9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/opinion/china-education-opinion/,.  
161. See Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2. 
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the rural population in achieving higher levels of education.162 
Students and their families, however, are left wondering exactly how 
the State Council plans on implementing these changes.163 More 
specifically, the State Council has promised migrant children higher 
quality primary and secondary education but has not indicated what 
this means for them.164  
III. THE 2014 GAOKAO REFORM IS NOT ENOUGH ON ITS OWN 
TO SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESS THE INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS 
THAT MIGRANT STUDENTS FACE IN ACCESSING TERTIARY 
EDUCATION 
As explained earlier, there are four key hukou-related 
institutional barriers to education that migrant students face in 
China.165 The State Council’s 2014 gaokao reform does not 
specifically address any of these barriers in enough detail to actually 
overcome the major problems that migrant students face in accessing 
tertiary education.166 The first three institutional barriers have to do 
with primary and secondary education in China.167 First, migrant 
students cannot attend elementary schools in the cities where they live 
because public education is only provided to students with local 
hukous.168 Second, there is no adequate funding to provide schooling 
for migrant students because public school funding is based on the 
population of urban hukou holders, and not the total number of 
students living in any particular city.169 Third, all students must attend 
high school in their place of registration as designated by their 
hukou.170  
The State Council stated in its 2014 reform that one of its goals 
is to improve primary and secondary education for migrant students in 
China.171 This is an important focus for the State Council because 
                                                            
162. See Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2; Beauchamp-Mustafaga, supra note 2 
(stating the State Council’s two main goals for the gaokao reform).  
163. See Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2; Beauchamp-Mustafaga, supra note 2, 
at 2 (stating the State Council’s two main goals for the gaokao reform).  
164. Examination Reform 2014, supra note 2. 
165. See supra Part II.A. 
166. See supra Part II.B.  
167. See supra Part II.A.1-2. 
168. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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these institutional barriers at the early stages of education prevent 
migrant students from ever reaching college.172 The State Council, 
however, did not provide any details as to how it will improve 
education for migrant children.173 There is a pressing need for the 
State Council to elaborate on specific plans to assist migrant students 
in accessing primary and secondary education.174 
The fourth institutional barrier to tertiary education is that the 
government sets different gaokao score cutoffs based on location, 
making it much easier for students from cities to get into college than 
students from rural areas.175 The State Council’s 2014 reform 
addresses this issue of the college quota system by increasing the 
number of spots available for students from Midwestern and populous 
provinces.176 Increasing the number of spots available to rural 
students at universities could counteract the problem created by 
setting differing gaokao score cutoffs based on location and therefore 
even out the admissions process between urban and rural students.177 
But without knowing the details of this reform, it is difficult to assess 
whether this feature could actually overcome an institutional barrier. 
178  
Further, while increasing the number of spots available at 
universities for students from poorer parts of the country will directly 
help migrant students access tertiary education, this change will not 
wholly address the other barriers that migrant children face.179 First, 
this system is very much like affirmative action in the United States, 
which tends to create feelings of resentment from the more privileged 
students.180 In China particularly, urban citizens may feel slighted by 
                                                            
172. See supra Part II.A.1-2.  
173. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra notes 89-126 and accompanying text (recommending that while the State 
Council wants to assist migrant students in accessing primary and secondary education, it must 
state how it will accomplish this goal in order for it to come to fruition). 
175. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing the custom of setting 
different cutoff scores for the gaokao based on location, making it easier for urban students 
over rural students to gain admission to universities). 
178. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 136-38, 142-47 and accompanying text (outlining additional 
barriers migrant children face in accessing tertiary education including the fact that students 
must take the gaokao in their place of registration according to their hukou).  
180. In the United States, “affirmative action” in higher education refers to admission 
policies facilitating equal access to education for groups that have been historically excluded 
or underrepresented, such as women and minorities. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
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their local governments who, in their opinion, should create systems 
that benefit them, rather than non-local citizens.181 Second, without 
fully eliminating the control that the hukou system has on education 
laws, migrant children will not be able to compete equally with their 
urban counterparts and gain equal access to tertiary education.182 
University enrollment opportunities can sometimes vary in different 
parts of China because of gaps in development and population.183 The 
government has worked on narrowing regional disparity in education 
for years, but without reform to the hukou system, there will never be 
a level playing field between urban and rural students.184  
In order to overcome the institutional barriers that migrant 
students face in accessing tertiary education, the Chinese education 
                                                                                                                                     
U.S. 306, 343 (2003). The policy, however, causes a form of reverse discrimination by 
favoring one group over another, based on racial preference rather than academic achievement. 
See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2000). Further, there is concern 
that minority groups may be stigmatized and treated differently by peers and professors who 
may believe that the success of minority groups in higher education institutions is unearned. 
See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 369 (2004). 
181. See YUN CHEN, TRANSITION AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: TOWARDS SHARED 
GROWTH 30-31 (2009) (explaining that urban citizens expect the local government to look 
after them and do not want to share their resources with migrants); see also GORDON 
MCGRANAHAN ET AL., China’s Radical Urbanisation and Bringing Capital and Labour 
Together Step by Step, in URBAN GROWTH IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: LESSONS FROM THE 
BRICS 55, 89 (2014) (explaining that “governments of wealthy places generally do not want 
to cover the social costs for large flows of low-income migrants, particularly if the migrants 
may not be able to secure employment” because resources should go to the local urban hukou 
holders). 
182. See supra Part II.A (explaining the major institutional barriers to education that 
migrant students face, and that are directly linked to the hukou system: public education 
admission is only available to local hukou holders; public school funding is based on the 
population of urban hukou holders; and the gaokao point cutoffs for college admissions are 
based on an applicant’s hukou location). 
183. See Bai Yang, supra note 148; Hongbin Li et. al., Unequal Access to College in 
China: How Far Have Poor, Rural Students Been Left Behind? 5, 17-18 (Rural Education 
Action Project, Working Paper 263, 2013) (concluding that rural students were eleven times 
less likely to access any college and elite colleges than urban students and that these gaps in 
college access were driven by rural-urban differences rather than income differences).  
184. Zhao & Chun, supra note 136 (arguing that there will never be a “level playing 
field” between urban and rural students without a more equal income distribution system that 
would come with a change to, among other things, the hukou system); see Bingqin Lin, 
China’s Hukou Reform a Small Step in the Right Direction, E. ASIA FORUM (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/01/13/chinas-hukou-reform-a-small-step-in-the-right-direc
tion/ (arguing that China needs to continue to reform the hukou system and the corresponding 
social services policy to eliminate inequalities between urban and rural areas).  
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system should be entirely independent from the hukou system.185 
Creating an educational system in China completely independent 
from the hukou system, however, is much easier said than done 
because the government may not have the funding necessary to 
educate the additional millions of migrant students.186 It is impractical 
to simply open the doors to millions of migrant students without any 
additional financial resources.187 The government would have to 
modify the tax system to account for the non-urban hukou-holding 
students in the cities, or come up with some system to account for the 
drastic increase in students.188 
Therefore, the State Council’s 2014 gaokao reform does not 
address any of the four, key hukou-related institutional barriers in 
enough detail to actually overcome the major problems that migrant 
students face in accessing tertiary education.189 The government does 
not provide any specifics about how it plans to assist migrant students 
in accessing primary and secondary education.190 And lastly, while 
the State Council’s reform addresses the issue of the university quota 
system by increasing the number of spots available for students from 
Midwestern and populous provinces, again there are no specifics 
about what modifications the State Council will make to the quota 
system – and, therefore, it is impossible to tell whether this reform 
will in fact help migrant students access tertiary education.191  
While the State Council has recognized an important goal of 
leveling out the playing field between rural and urban students in 
                                                            
185. See Goodburn, supra note 19, at 8 (arguing that the current hukou reform, which 
eliminates the “agricultural” and “non-agricultural” distinction, does not do enough, and that 
the government must make fundamental changes to how it provides public services); China’s 
Hukou System Puts Migrant Workers at Severe Economic Disadvantage, PRI (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-05-01/chinas-hukou-system-puts-migrant-workers-severe-eco
nomic-disadvantage (explaining that some Chinese citizens hope that the government relaxes 
the hukou system even further, or even abolishes it, so that migrant students can stay in the 
cities through senior high school and take the gaokao in the cities so that they “have a better 
chance of reaching their highest potential, which in turn benefits the urban economy”). 
186. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (increasing migrant student access 
to urban schools would be a huge financial burden to local governments because they would 
no longer receive the additional school fees that they earn from migrant students, and would 
therefore have to come up with more money to expand schools to accommodate the new 
students). 
187. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text. 
188. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra Part II.B. 
190. See supra note 166 & 1743 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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accessing tertiary education, it has failed to specifically enumerate 
how the 2014 reforms will be carried out.192 It is likely that China will 
need much more time and many more reforms before the rural 
migrant population actually experiences a change in the college 
admissions process.193 Moreover, the State Council should put more 
effort into reforming the hukou system, which is truly at the core of 
each level of institutional barrier to education that migrant students 
face.194  
CONCLUSION 
This Note has discussed the barriers that the hukou system 
creates for migrant students in accessing tertiary education in China. 
The hukou system and the education system are inextricably related, 
hindering migrant students’ opportunities beginning in the earliest 
stages of compulsory education and rising all the way up to the level 
of tertiary education. By the time migrant students reach the age to sit 
for the gaokao, they stand little chance to compete with their urban 
counterparts. The State Council has identified an important goal of 
shrinking the inequality gap in educational opportunities between the 
rural and urban students. This goal is important in order to allow 
China to advance its economy from one based on unskilled, cheap 
labor towards a more skilled, innovative, and dynamic workforce and 
therefore compete internationally with sophisticated economies like 
the United States.  
Given the problem of noncompliance and lack of legal 
enforcement in China, one cannot expect this reform to effect 
                                                            
192. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (discussing that the State Council 
did not specify how the reform will create equal opportunities for rural students to access 
higher education). 
193. See Jiang Xueqin, supra note 160 (arguing that the gaokao reform is “just window 
dressing” and advocating that to truly help the rural population the government should spend 
resources on a Finnish-style early childhood education program to address early deficiencies in 
nutrition and emotional stability, a German-style vocational training to provide marketable 
skills, and a more developed system of community colleges); Patti Waldmeir, China’s 
University System Faces Criticism for Being Unfit for a Modern Economy, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/2/07c0aa44-283b-11e4-9ea9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3YQRrKjip (last visited April 26, 
2015) (quoting experts such as Xiong Bingqi, vice-president of the 21st Century Education 
Research Institute in Beijing, arguing that little has been achieved as of 2014, the mid-point of 
the gaokao reform plan period (2010-2020), that the problem with China’s higher education is 
that the government runs the universities, and that therefore the universities have no 
autonomy).  
194. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.  
2015] "ONE EXAM DETERMINES ONE'S LIFE" 1509 
immediate and significant changes. China has a long way to go before 
achieving an education system where rural and urban students have 
equal opportunities to attend top universities. Chairman Mao 
Zedong’s words in 1964 still ring true today. He advised: “[a]ny 
drastic change is difficult, as many people would oppose it.”195 The 
gaokao is still viewed by many citizens as one of the fairest systems 
in China and one of the only opportunities for social mobility because 
rather than one’s future being predetermined by one’s family 
background, each student is judged based on his or her gaokao score. 
Therefore, many citizens, even the rural citizens, resist change to this 
age-old system. Despite the resistance to change, the State Council’s 
efforts to level out the playing field for the entire populating by aiding 
rural students achieve higher levels of education is significant for 
China’s future advancement.  
 
                                                            
195. See supra note 1.  
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